It is in the name of Islam that the country has created an image of being the most potent source of religious terrorism, which poses a threat to peace and stability in large parts of the globe. This conception of a Pakistani ideology and Pakistani identity based on Islam was put forward by the religious circles rather than the founding fathers of the nation. At the time of independence even the secular ideologists were also looking at Islam as the key symbol which consolidated the newly born and somewhat anomalous nation.
collectively along with other members of the caste or tribe or nation; some embrace it for political or economic advantages; and some after studying the religion. In its historical march to its present expanse, Islam has destroyed empires, countries, religions, cultures and people. In the process it even opposed the Sufi Islam which toned down the hard features of the original and introduced new concepts. Sufi Islam conditioned the Islamic mindset to acceptance of co-existence with other cultures and religions. Islamic extremism is invariably a politically driven and seldom a purely religious movement. It has no sanction either in Quran or in the practices of the holy Prophet of Islam. Distorted interpretation of various historical events by some Islamic clerics led to violence against non-Muslims in the past. The creed of tolerance compassion, charity and civilised behaviour preached and practised by Prophet Muhammad was forgotten soon after his departure from the scene. The stern commands in the holy Quran pertained to particular situations such as murderous attacks on Muhammad and his followers by the pagan tribesmen. These were later misinterpreted or used by vested interests to wage wars against political opponents. The terrible massacre of Karbala, in a battle for political supremacy and power, illustrated the ruthlessness of tribal customs to achieve political ends.
In the course of its spreading far and wide Islam came to India with Arab invasions, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, in particular. Initially, the Islam that settled down in India was not so radical. Its core got impacted by Hindu philosophy, bhakti movements which provided Islam a broadly based co-existence with all religions of India. For over 300 years, Islam remained peaceful as a religion and took its place among the many religions of India without trouble or conflict. Before Islam, Jainism and Buddhism had been absorbed by Hinduism. Also, Christianity and the Hebrew religion, which had reached India probably during the first century after Christ, had found a place in the country. Historically, Hindu society had shown a peculiar ability to absorb and culturally assimilate groups which entered its fold from outside, even with military power (Singh, 2008) . But Islam was the first exception. Islamic groups had much greater cultural self -confidence, and clearer self-recognition in terms of doctrines and observances. This prevented an absorption into Hindu society in the treacherously insidious way that had been the 136 common fate of earlier intruders. The new approach produced powerful psychological reactions among the people and filled them with bitterness. There was no objection to a new religion but there was a strong objection to anything which forcibly interfered with and upset their way of life.
As a result of the industrial revolution more or less world over, large sections of the population moved from their original surroundings, resulting in a deep sense of dislocation and alienation. At the same time it fails to provide an alternative set of values and along with it, a sense of belonging to these people. To offset this deficiency, they tried to reclaim and assert their traditional identities more stridently. The alienation generated in the process of modernisation provided the material for the growth of orthodox religious forms (Nandy, 1989) . It is said that this modern phenomenon of terrorist movement is born out of frustration and despair. Despair caused by social marginalisation, economic decline and political defeat. Leon Trotsky once described the two emotions central to terrorism as being despair and vengeance. The betrayed hopes that one talks of are, as we are aware, the hopes of diverse communities to obtain their fair share of the cake (Kumaratunga, 2002) . In a nutshell, the Islamic fundamentalism or pristine puritan Islam had lost its original dynamism and failed to meet the challenges of the time.
Initial Response of Leadership
The new state called Pakistan was a creation of the Muslim League that was founded in 1906 to oppose the Indian National Congress (INC) and therefore, the former had hardly any members who had fought for the independence of the country. The result was that the power came into the hands of either retired officials or men who had been brought into public life under British patronage. It created a wide gap between the ruler and the ruled in the newly formed nation while the public or society of it was a bewilderingly patchy. There are classes within class, castes within caste, social groups, ethnic groups, linguistic groups, urban modern educated elite, rural, feudal benighted masses, opulent industrialists, rich feudal lords and the seedy hangers-on the fundamentalists with the arch conservative and orthodox outlook, and the secular, democratic enlightened and liberal sections of society with the modernist view of man and society. In 1947, all Sikhs and nearly all high-caste Hindus left Pakistan. Cities and villages became totally Muslim. The resultant confessional homogeneity in Pakistan created a favourable environment for Islamic folk culture. The situation of that time was also characterised by the low level of religious education.
The perception of "Fundamentalism" has come to imply a dogmatic adherence to tradition, orthodoxy, inflexibility and a rejection of modern society, intellectual innovations, and attempts to recreate a golden era. Essentially, the term suggests going back to the basic texts and reproducing, as closely as possible, the laws and institutions found in its domain. Apart from its more ominous aspects, it also suggests bypassing the clergy and going back to the original sources for guidance. In the confusion engendered by modernisation, it means authenticity and rootedness, which gives it strength and resilience. That all of this is not enough for it to grapple with contemporary reality, to respond to that challenge or even to release the full potential of its adherents, is another matter altogether (Abrahamian, 1991) . However, the term "Fundamentalism" has been used in Western discourse to designate the moribund and hostile "other". The assessment is frequently made about Third World Muslim societies which, in general, do not appreciate dynamic populist movements.
It is in the name of Islam that the country has created an image of being the most potent source of religious terrorism, which poses a threat to peace and stability in large parts of the globe. This conception of a Pakistani ideology and Pakistani identity based on Islam was put forward by the religious circles rather than the founding fathers of the nation. At the time of independence, even the secular ideologists were also looking at Islam as the key symbol which consolidates the newly born and somewhat anomalous nation (Belokrenitsky, 2004) . The motive force for Pakistan came largely from the middle class Muslims of North India, many of whom had been educated at Aligarh. At some level, they identified with the ideas of Syed Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal, along with the leaders of Muslim League, including Mohammad Ali Jinnah. They all thought sincerely about the application of Islamic principles, but they certainly did not regard the movement for Pakistan as an effort to re-create some kind of a "golden age" in Islam or to re-establish Wahabiism. The large number of Muslims who opted for somewhat secular leadership of the Muslim League accepted the Islamic values but denied the belief that the Ulema derive their authority from within the Quran and Sunnah. According to them there is in Islam no Church or priestly class, counterposed to the state and enjoying a kind of divine sanction.
This situation of Islam in the new-born nation disappointed a large number of people, mostly Ulemas, who had migrated there to establish themselves and as a result, from the start, they challenged the leadership on the Islamic nature of the Pakistani state. The Ulema were in favour of Islam playing a dominant role in Pakistan. However, they were never clear and unanimous about what the role should be. In contrast to this view, the modernist, Western-educated political leaders and intellectuals sought the Pakistani state to be based on the Western parliamentary model, with Islam playing a role only in the personal lives of the people.
The new nation, starting with this position, allowed the debate on the kind of state but soon Pakistan shifted significantly in favour of the Islamist lobby. The pro-Islam Objective Resolution was introduced in the Constituent Assembly in 1949 which, with some modifications, became the preamble to the Constitution, and eventually was made a substantive part of the Constitution. The Objective Resolution affirmed that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone," that therefore the people of Pakistan were to exercise power only "within the limits prescribed by Him," and that Muslims would be enabled to order their lives in the individual and the collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (Ahmad, 1967) . Under the circumstances, the leadership that had assumed control of the new state, though committed to Islam in broader terms, was largely Westernised and secular in outlook; however, it faced widespread disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, which showed a remarkable strength of the Islamists, on the one hand, and weaknesses of the government, on the other. From there onwards, the Islamist parties of the time became keenly aware of the potential for agitational politics under the cover of sensitive religious issues. As a result, successive civilian governments sought the short-cut of adopting an Islamic formalism to assuage what they saw as potentially 139 disruptive forces in society. At various points of time in Pakistan's history, religion has been exploited by the ruling elite to gain popularity and legitimacy and fight political opponents. Even the modernisation of Islam by Ayub Khan and later, by Z.A. Bhutto, failed to outplay the conservative Islamist circles which did not trust them and their policies.
The Role of General Zia-ul-Haq
A major step forward was taken to promote religious fundamentalism in Pakistan from the mid-1970s on, especially when on 5 July 1977, a military takeover under Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief of Army Staff, assumed power in the country. Zia-ul-Haq, the new ruler, was everything -judge, jury and executioner, Head of State, Chief of Martial Law Administrator, Commander-in-Chief and honorary mullah. Though, like Ayub and Yahya, he did not wage any war with India, he did prepare the society of Pakistan for a long-proxy war, first in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, and then in Kashmir against India (Singh, 2009) . With a view to legitimising his rule, Zia began to be working towards creating structures for an Islamic state and society within Pakistan. He started with a series of 'reforms' designed to bring law in various areas of activity in conformity with the tenets of Islam. The radical Islamisation of Pakistan began under Zia when he drafted the Ulema or mullahs to legitimise and extend his unconstitutional rule. In the process, several controversial Islamic provisions were inducted in the constitution, which later proved to be so damaging to the constitution and the rights of the people. It is widely held that they changed the very complexion of an otherwise nonviolent Pakistani society. The shameful Hudood laws curbing the rights of women, redefining law of evidence, amending the blasphemy law, establishing Federal Shariat Court and revising religious laws to create rifts among various sects, were some of the more obscurantist changes (Zaidi, 2002) . Zia exploited the religion to the hilt. He misused religion to prolong his despotic rule.
At independence, Pakistan had five major ethnic groups: Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis; since independence, one ethnic group (Punjabis) has dominated the rest. This was possible, perhaps, for two reasons. The Punjabis had been the backbone of the British Indian army, and became so also of the Pakistan army. The political leadership's concern with Pakistan's territorial security catapulted the military to political prominence, which created a permanent role of the military high command in national politics. This apart was the fact that the Punjabis comprised 56 per cent of West Pakistan's population at the time, also led to Punjabi domination of the affairs of the state (Hassan, 1993) . In the then ethnic distribution except Punjabis, Sindhis constituted 22 per cent, Pathans 13 per cent, Baluchis 4 per cent and the rest, 5 per cent.
The coming of Zia-ul-Haq as the new ruler of Pakistan was responsible for the ethnic disturbances in the country. Some sectarian groups -Sipah-i-Sahaba and Tehrik-i-Jafena -surfaced and flourished under Zia's patronage. Ethnic parties especially Muttahida Quami Movement, formerly Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) and its rival group Haqiqi, were also said to be the creation of the martial law administration. He started a calculated move to part between Sindhi and non-Sindhi, Sindhi and Mohajir. The hanging of Z.A. Bhutto in 1979 had further widened the gap not only between the Sindhi in rural areas and the military regime but also with the people of Pakistan in general. The new incident had created an overt hostility between the military and the Sindhi population. The power of the central government became identified with a particular ethnic group (Mazari, 1996) . In order to undermine the political support of Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) in Sindh, Zia encouraged the Mohajirs, who constituted about 20 per cent, to come together under one political platform, and it was for the first time that an All Pakistan Mohajir Student's Organisation (APMSO) was formed in 1978. In a nutshell, General Zia was responsible overtly and covertly for the confrontation in both rural and urban regions of the province. In targeting the Sindhis, Zia succeeded in assimilating discontented Pathans into Pakistan national politics.
The regime of General Zia witnessed the growing importance of Islamic militants in the political system. The two main Islamic parties of Pakistan, Jamiatul-ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islamic (JI), had been actively involved in Afghanistan, first in the anti-Soviet Jehad and later in support of the Taliban. The Jamaat-i-Islami had organised itself as armed cadre of workers, particularly among students. The external arms and money linkages were developed by Islamist forces. What mattered here was the existence of these militant organisations, their 141 initial training in Pakistani Madrassas, their operations in Afghanistan, their links with political parties, the ISI and the army. As a fallout from Afghan turmoil, guns, drugs and state sponsored terrorism proliferated; a mafia-like culture prevailed in parts of Pakistan, further straining its weak institutional framework and thereby creating a threat to internal security and stability (Beg, 1996) . Thus, Zia's laws and policies resulted in making vast sections of the population extremely vulnerable to the Islamic militancy by replacing a tolerant and liberal civil society with an intolerant and retrogressive one. Zia-ul-Haq used Islam to perpetuate his autocratic rule but left behind a legacy of division, disruption, contradiction and conflicts.
The Islamisation drive of Zia-ul-Haq brought to the surface all sorts of contradictions among Muslim trends and sects. The difference between different religious trends produced alienation among the Muslims and pushed them in open antagonism, enmity and bloodshed. The Deobandi school is extremely intolerant of all Islamic trends, its radical part looks at the Shi'ites as infidels. The enmity between them in central and southern Punjab developed into a blood feud typical of the local folk culture and a string of terrorist acts that were going on for many years. By the late eighties, the detachment of militants had been strengthened with the people who fought in Afghanistan. The Jihad against the Soviet troops was felt in Punjab and other provinces. The geopolitical sickle of Islamic extremism stretched from Afghanistan and Kashmir in the north and reached Pakistan in its middle part. This situation survived throughout the last decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the new century and was even strengthened with the sickle of radical Islamism.
General Pervez Musharraf
General Pervez Musharraf inherited the ethnic tension and a more acute and formidable "Islamisation Programme" in the then Pakistan. The post-Zia regimes headed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif continued with more or less the same sort of highly centralised, repressive and negative approach as adopted by their predecessors to deal with the regional tensions. The already complicated scene in the Sindh province was wrecked by violence. Thousands of innocent people had fallen victim to the sectarian fanaticism of armed militia. The polarisation of Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Awami National Party (ANP) and other factions of Pakistan sharpened when the Sharif government unveiled its plan to introduce a constitutional amendment to amass more powers.
At the time Pervez Musharraf tookover, the Islamist hardliners, who were on the defensive in the initial days, had started to make a comeback with their characteristic assertiveness. After the regime's retreat on the issue of rationalising the blasphemy law, the Islamist political forces had even found the courage to challenge the military establishment. Similar to Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf began to tell the world that Jihad, in its true understanding, delineates war cultures and shuns terrorism and therefore, the two should not be confused. The implied meaning of his statement was that his military regime has no control over the Mujahideen whom he called freedom fighters and that their actions are purely voluntary. Hence, Pakistan is following Jihad, not terrorism (The Herald, 2000: 50-52). In a hurridly convened press conference in Karachi, Lieutenant General Tareeq Wasin Ghazi, the Corps Commander of the Sindh province, made it clear that no official campaign was going on against the Jihadi organisations to stop them from collecting funds.
In fact, Pervez Musharraf never initiated a crackdown on Jihadi, its organisations and producing factory-madrassas in order to appease the religious support for his rule. As part of the alleged "deal", the military government, notwithstanding its public statements, turned a blind eye to the Jihadi activities. The ordinance promulgated to regulate the functions of madrassas on 19 August 2001 remained a piece of paper and madrassas remained factories for the mass production of zealots ready to die for Jihad all over the world. Madrassas are the labour suppliers, producing the raw material on which Jihad is driven. The wheels of which are well oiled by the wealthy Pakistani diaspora who pour in money along with Wahabis of Saudi Arabia. Besides, Pakistan's government has encouraged the establishment of such a large number of Islamic militant organisations and groups -Taliban, Harkat-ulMujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-e-Wahadat, Sipah-e-Sabaha Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhougvi, Spipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan and Jaish-e-Mohammad in the last 10 to 15 years (Khan, 1998) .
The most typical of these organisations and the one with the largest manpower and resources is the Lashkar-e-Toiba. The Lashkar was formed after the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation was nearly over and it is primarily meant to train recruits to fight battle in Kashmir.
Conclusion
In a dramatic development, the general elections in Pakistan were held for the National Assembly in February 2008 and the restoration of democracy in the country was welcomed by all. As a result of the victory, a coalition of PPP and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif), an elected government, took over the administration with Yousuf Raza Gilani as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan in March 2008. But the restoration of democracy has hardly made any difference on the promotion of religious fundamentalism. In the name of Islam, it has created an image of being the most potent source of religious terrorism, which poses a threat to peace and stability in large parts of the globe. It has become the biggest source of most of its internal conflicts in recent years.
